How to Lose the Peace

The New York Times provides some details of the latest Battle of Najaf:

What the Marines had hoped would be a quick, decisive action has bogged down into a grinding battle that appears to have strengthened the hand of Mr. Sadr, whose stature rises each time he survives a confrontation with the American military. It may have weakened the credibility of the interim Iraqi government of Prime Minister Ayad Allawi, showing him, many Iraqis say, to be alternately rash and indecisive, as well as ultimately beholden to American overrule on crucial military and political matters.

As a reconstruction of the battle in Najaf shows, the sequence of events was strikingly reminiscent of the battle of Falluja in April. In both cases, newly arrived Marine units immediately confronted guerrillas in firefights that quickly escalated. And in both cases, the American military failed to achieve its strategic goals, pulling back after the political costs of the confrontation rose. Falluja is now essentially off-limits to American ground troops and has become a haven for Sunni Muslim insurgents and terrorists menacing Baghdad, American commanders say.

The net result of the latest fighting is that Sadr is now even more credible in the eyes of many Iraqis as a voice against the occupation:

Militant cleric Muqtada Sadr's refusal Tuesday to meet with a delegation of Iraqi religious and political leaders is the clearest indicator yet that recent fighting in Najaf has strengthened the anti-American leader, some analysts say.

The snub, which followed last week's breakdown of talks with envoys of interim Prime Minister Iyad Allawi, made it clear that Sadr expected any resolution to the two-week confrontation to proceed on his terms and timetable. The message was reinforced by the 1,000 militiamen who greeted the delegation with raised fists and shouts of "Long live Muqtada!"

Several observers say Allawi and U.S. forces have no viable options other than trying for a negotiated end to the uprising because attempting to crush Sadr militarily would carry too high a political price.

"In all probability, it would take an unacceptable level of force in and around the shrine," noted Cliff Kupchan, a Middle East specialist at the Nixon Center in Washington. "Whether Iraqi troops do this or Americans, it would be a generational setback for U.S. legitimacy in the Arab world."...

Analysts believe that a key to Sadr's political clout has been his emergence as the only national symbol of defiance to the massive U.S. military presence that remains in Iraq despite the formal hand-over of sovereignty. As the U.S. presence grows more unpopular, Sadr's aura gains more luster...

In his public statements, Sadr has made opposition to the American presence tantamount to a patriotic duty.

"Everyone can learn from him on how he has used the media to communicate his message," noted Bruce Hoffman, acting director of the Rand Corp. Center for Middle East Public Policy in Washington. "He came out of nowhere into a vacuum to become the most recognized populist political figure in Iraq."

Recall that last year Team Bush was publicly hoping for a Sh'ia rebellion in the country, the idea being they'd naturally follow the "old arab saying" that James Baker was fond of during Gulf War I: the enemy of the enemy is my friend. However, it now appears that a good number of Iraqis, regardless of religious preference, have simply lopped off the last six words in the statement.