War is Politics by Other Means

At least two of the big hitters in the blogosphere, Atrios and Steve Gilliard, point to this Washington Post article about the assault on Fallujah last April. Lt. Gen. James T. Conway, the commander on the ground, has some interesting things to say about the decision to attack:

Conway arrived in Iraq in March pledging to accelerate reconstruction projects as a way to subdue Anbar province, dominated by Sunni Muslims. But on March 31 he was confronted in Fallujah with the killing of four U.S. security contractors, whose bodies were mutilated or burned by a celebrating mob. Conway said he resisted calls for revenge, and instead advocated targeted operations and continued engagement with municipal leaders.

"We felt like we had a method that we wanted to apply to Fallujah: that we ought to probably let the situation settle before we appeared to be attacking out of revenge," he said in an interview with four journalists after the change-of-command ceremony. "Would our system have been better? Would we have been able to bring over the people of Fallujah with our methods? You'll never know that for sure, but at the time we certainly thought so."

He echoed an argument made by many Iraqi politicians and American analysts -- that the U.S. attack further radicalized a restive city, leading many residents to support the insurgents. "When we were told to attack Fallujah, I think we certainly increased the level of animosity that existed," Conway said.

He would not say where the order to attack originated, only that he received an order from his superior at the time, Army Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez, the overall commander of U.S. forces in Iraq. Some senior U.S. officials in Iraq have said the command originated in the White House.

Moving the clock back up to the present, today's news is unfortunately more of the same and then some. Dozens of Iraqis from throughout the country were killed in the various attacks by insurgents, followed by US retaliation (which was indiscriminate, killing combatants, non-combatants, and a correspondent for Al-Arabiya television).

In this type of war, tactical "victories" can amount to strategic defeats, and that's pretty much what occurred here. There is not a single area that could be described as "pacified," and our continued resort to military action will continue to outrage a population sick and tired of our presence.

Bush and his supporters will argue that the mission ended the regime of Saddam. Well, yes. But to crow about this "accomplishment" when the true measure of the Iraq invasion continues to play out is like a football team assuming they'll win because they scored a field goal in the first quarter. And, in this case, it looks like Team Bush really didn't have a plan for the rest of the game.

So, instead, they'll simplify (imagine that). Anyone who dares criticize will be accused of being a "Saddam lover," or worse. Iraq itself will be swept under the rug by a compliant press corps that dares not upset the dauphin and his vicious, evil Roveservant. Unfortunately for the country and especially for those actually wearing the uniform, such simplification and obfuscation means they'll both pay the price and be ignored--which suits Bush just fine. He personally never had much use for the military anyway.

This country, however, DOES have a strong, vested interest in our soldiers--not to mention a strong, vested interest in our reputation as a nation. Allowing the Bushoviks free reign is costing us dearly. Our position in Iraq is untenable. The doctrine of Preventive War has proven to be an utter failure. The costs of Bush's invasions, in lives and money, show no sign of abating any time soon, and our power and prestige have sunk significantly. When we finally pull out of Iraq--and we will--the world will perceive it--correctly--as a loss, and this will reduce our influence even further.

Amazing--all this because Bush wanted a glorious little war to base his reelection on...