Fallujah'ed

Perhaps soon to become a term not all that different from "Cheney'ed", Fallujah is presently experiencing liberation, American-style. However, as Patrick Cockburn points out, even a "successful" taking of the city is little more than a mirage when it comes to judging the success of Operation Stuck-in-the-Desert:

The belligerent trumpetings of the US Marines bode ill for Fallujah. Sgt Major Carlton W Kent, the senior enlisted marine in Iraq, told troops that the battle would be no different from Iwo Jima. In an analogy the Pentagon may not relish, he recalled the Tet offensive in Vietnam in 1968 and added: "This is another Hue city."

American voters last week never seemed to take on board the extent of the US military failure in Iraq. The rebel control of Fallujah, half an hour's drive from Baghdad, was the most evident symbol of this. It was as if a British government in London had been forced to watch as an enemy force occupied Reading for six months.

If you're more comfortable with analogies closer to the United States, Fallujah is about as close to Baghdad as LaPlace is to New Orleans. Fallujah is closer to Baghdad than Baltimore is to Washington D.C.

It's as if you had armed resistance in Durham or Chapel Hill taking on North Carolina's state government in Raleigh.

The recapture of Fallujah is likely to be as disappointing in terms of ending the resistance as was the capture of Saddam Hussein last December or the hand-over of sovereignty to an interim Iraqi government at the end of June. Each event was billed as a success which would tip the balance towards the US. Instead the fighting got bloodier and more widespread.

There should be no mystery about why this is happening. All countries object to being occupied. Foreign invasions provoke nationalist resistance. This has happened with extraordinary speed in Iraq because of the ineptitude of the US civil and military commanders, but in the long term it would have happened anyway.

"Extraordinary speed..." Cockburn is the first major journalist I've seen who's expressed the same feelings I've had for some time regarding the invasion--it was doomed to fail eventually, but the fact that it fell apart so rapidy is surprising. I was of course expecting Team Bush to adhere to a rough approximation of the so-called "Powell Doctrine," i.e., overwhelming numbers, limited objective, definite exit strategy, etc. If we HAD done this, I don't doubt Iraq would be more stable at present. But the wheels would eventually have come off--because, as Cockburn notes, no one likes being occupied.

Cockburn closes with a final analogy, comparing the US situation with that of the French in Algeria (and with our experience in Vietnam):

The French failed to hold Algeria against a nationalist revolt despite fielding an army of half a million. With similar numbers the US failed in Vietnam. With a much smaller army in Iraq, it will fail again. As in Algeria and Vietnam, the war in Iraq will only cease when an end to the occupation is in sight.

As I've mentioned, I'm still plowing through my "summer" reading project about the French experience in North Africa. It's not an exact match, but the very unfortunate fact is that the French stood a much better chance than we do.

Finally, like in Algeria, insurgents can continue to engage in acts of violence--it doesn't matter if such acts are "random" or "targeted." The population of Iraq will rightly accuse us of not providing the internal security we are OBLIGATED to ensure as the occupying force. And, as we all know, the Iraqi insurgents have plenty of ordinance. Bush's policies did everything short of literally handing explosives, ammunition, and other such supplies over.

Even if we take the city over the next few days, when it comes to Iraq, we're Fallujah'ed.